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RÉSUMÉ
De récents développements en théorie de la decision ont largement enrichi notre
connaissance de la notion d’incertitude knightienne, usuellement appelée ambiguïté.
Néanmoins ces dévelopement tardent à être intégrés au coeur de la théorie économique.
Nous suggérons que l’analyse de phénonèmes économiques tel que l’innovation et la
Recherche et Développement gagnerait à intégrer les modèles de décision en situation
d’ambiguïté. Nous étayons notre propos en analysant l’allocation des droits de propriété
d’une découverte. Les deux premières parties de la présentation s’inspire d’un modèle
d’Aghion et de Tirole, The Management of Innovation, portant sur l’allocation des droits
de propriété entre une unité de recherche et un investisseur. Il est démontré qu’un désac-
cord entre les agents sur la technologie de recherche affecte leur niveau d’effort, l’allo-
cation des droits de propriété et l’allocation des revenus subséquents. Finalement, nous
examinons une situation où plusieurs chercheurs sont en compétition en s’inspirant du
traitement de l’incertitude de Savage. La présence d’ambuïgité affecte le comportement
des agents et l’allocation des droits de propriétés de manière qui n’est pas captée en
assumant l’hypothèse de risque.
Mots clés: Incertitude, Risque, Ambiguité, Bayésianisme, néo-Bayésianisme, Sa-
vage, Innovation, Recherche et Développement, Droits de propriété, Organisation
industrielle.
ABSTRACT
Recent developments in decision-theory have shed light on the concept of Knightian
Uncertainty, or Ambiguity. However, this apparatus is still not fully integrated in eco-
nomic theory. This presentation argue that the analysis of innovation and Research and
Developments will gain substantial insights by modelling these activities as decision-
making under Ambiguity. The main subject of of interest of this paper is the allocation
of the property rights of a discovery. The first part of the analysis draws on a paper of
Aghion and Tirole, The Management of Innovation, where they look at the optimal al-
location of the property rights between a Research Unit and its financier. Allowing for
heterogeneous beliefs affects the level of effort of the two agents, the sharing rule of the
revenue of a discovery and the allocation of property rights. The second part follows
Savage’s framework to model an innovation competition between multiple researchers.
The presence of Ambiguity impacts the behaviour of the agents and the allocation of the
property rights in a way that could not be captured assuming Risk.
Keywords: Uncertainty, Risk, Ambiguity, Bayesianism, neo-Bayesianism, Sav-
age, Innovation, Research and Development, Property rights, Industrial Organiza-
tion.
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Most economists agree that entrepreneurship and innovation are the backbone of
capitalism. The preeminent feature of entrepreneurs is the high level of risk and Uncer-
tainty to which they willingly expose themselves. They play the market at great personal
risk, taking the chance to lose everything if their plans goes wrong. But the rewards
are worth the risk, and the fortune of a successful entrepreneur far outreaches the initial
investment. The growth of modern capitalist economies is dependent on the evolution of
a specific type of innovation: technological innovation. Most technological innovation
comes from sophisticated Research and Development (R&D) activities taking place in
the private and public sector. But R& D shares many features of entrepreneurship: the
risks and rewards are high, the initial investments are lost if the project fails, and they
face a high level of Uncertainty. Moreover, both activities rely on a strong structure of
property rights to make sure the innovator will receive the rewards for his efforts.
It is in this line of thought that I want to understand the impact of Uncertainty on
the allocation of the property rights of an innovation. I leave aside entrepreneurship and
focus on R&D. This choice is justified in the second chapter. R&D has been approached
from different angles and a broad literature exists on the topic. I do not cover it ex-
tensively; a complete survey of the literature on R& D needs to range from Industrial
Organisation to Financial economics, amongst others. A task too monumental for this
essay. But numerous papers share one characteristic: they model the Uncertainty of R&
D assuming Risk and the Expected Utility model. I depart from it by assuming that the
Uncertainty surrounding R&D is Knightian Uncertainty, or Ambiguity.
The decision-theoretic literature about Ambiguity is still relatively new but it is also
substantial. Again, it is not covered he extensively. Specific Utility functions are used.
Those Utility functions are two special cases of Invariant Biseparable preferences called
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the MaxMin Expected Utility and the MaxMax Expected Utility. Chapter three is a
short overview of the mechanics of Ambiguity where examples of Invariant Biseparable
preferences are provided. A complete presentation of decision-making under Ambiguity
could be found in [Gilboa and Marinacci, 2013]. A reader familiar with the topic and
with Savage’s framework of Subjective Expected Utility can safely go over chapter three.
The creative part of the essay is chapter four and five. Chapter four draws on a pa-
per of Aghion and Tirole, The management of innovation, and builds a model of R&D
where the researcher and the investor agree to disagree. I consider a situation where both
agents maximise their Subjective Expected Utility but where I allow for heterogeneity of
beliefs. The main result is simple: the more an agent is "optimistic" about the probability
of a discovery, the more he wants to own the property rights of the innovation and the
more he is willing to invest in the research project. This chapter does not build a model
of decision-making under Ambiguity, although there is a direct correspondence under
strict assumptions. These implicit assumptions are presented in chapter five.
Chapter five is the heart of the presentation. I model a R&D competition under Am-
biguity with multiple research projects and investors. The model is based on Savage’s
framework of subjective probabilities but where the agents can exhibit Invariant Bisepa-
rable preferences. Building upon the insights of chapter four clear trends in the allocation
of property rights are identified. Agents with the opposite Ambiguity Attitude tend to
pair with each other while agreeing to allocate the property rights of the innovation to
the most Ambiguity Loving of them. This is because the effectiveness of the incentive
of ownership depends on the Ambiguity Attitude of the agents. This chapter concludes
by looking at the impact of introducing a third agent, a patent holder. This patent holder
has the ability to give access to a patent pool to a researcher at zero cost. This patent
pool increases the probability of winning the R&D competition. The introduction of a
patent holder affects both the allocation of resources between research projects and the
ownership structure of some research projects.
CHAPTER 2
1- MOTIVATIONS
Frank Hyneman Knight, in his seminal book “Risk, Uncertainty and Profit” [Frank
Hyneman Knight, 1948], makes the distinction between Risk and what is now called
Knightian Uncertainty, or Ambiguity. He defines Risk as a form of Uncertainty that is
measurable, such as flipping a coin or rolling a dice. It is a situation where the informa-
tion is good enough to allow the decision-maker to describe all the possible states of the
world with a unique probability distribution. On the other hand, Knightian Uncertainty
is opaque. An agent facing Knightian Uncertainty is not only unable to predict the fu-
ture, but he also has difficulty describing the relationships that may lead to this possible
future. For Knight, the presence of this second type of Uncertainty presents a possibility
for entrepreneurs to earn positive profits. Those profit opportunities exist even in the
long run. When the entrepreneurs take risks 1 and innovate they identify profit opportu-
nities in the economy that are not necessarily arbitrages. Entrepreneurs serve society as a
whole because they open new realms of economic activity. There is now a large literature
on the place of entrepreneurs in capitalism and Knight definitely had a large impact on it.
It is in the spirit of the Austrian tradition that I approach the topic of Research and
Development (R&D). I focus on R&D in particular and not on innovations in general
because R&D has attractive properties that makes it particularly amenable to analysis.
Investing in R&D is an act of volition; the agents intends to make a discovery, to cre-
ate something new that did not previously exist. Some of them are willing to take the
risk of losing the money and the effort they invested. Furthermore, the R&D activity
is oriented toward specific goals. Those goals take multiple forms such as inventing a
new product, a new production process, etc. The goals can be ill-defined, but a least
there is a direction toward which the agent wishes to progress. Those two characteris-
1. We define risk with a lower-case r as a situation where the exposition to Uncertainty can bring a bad
outcome to the decision-maker. Both Risk and Knightian Uncertainty can contain risks.
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tics make R&D different from other kinds of innovation that comes from some form of
tâtonnement. Entrepreneurs can discover profits and arbitrage opportunities but they do
not necessarily search for them consciously. In short, R&D needs the making of choices
and judgement call before the innovation, and those choices are amenable to analysis.
The last important feature of R&D is that discoveries can be protected by patents, but
not all forms of entrepreneurial innovation have this privilege.
Which brings us to the main subject of the presentation. In the last decades an im-
portant body of literature has been written about Ambiguity. This literature gives the
mathematical foundation and apparatus to model a higher order of Uncertainty. It could
be argued that Ambiguity and Knightian Uncertainty are not the same. This distinction
does not matter to me. To the extent of my knowledge few authors have used Ambiguity
to analyse entrepreneurship and R&D. I intend to partially fill this gap by modelling the
allocation of the property rights of a discovery. I look at the impact of Ambiguity on the
incentives to invest in R&D and the allocation of the resulting patent. But the aim of this
presentation is two-fold. The second goal is to show how decision-theoretic models can
be used to understand economic problems such as R&D.
There are a few things I do not claim to do. I do not claim to provide a complete or
exhaustive analysis of the allocation of the property rights under Ambiguity. I restrict
my attention to special cases of Invariant Biseparable preferences that are readily suited
to model R&D. But decision-theory can provide more than what can be covered here.
I also do not claim to conduct any normative analysis of R&D and patent allocation.
It will become clear that Ambiguity makes it challenging to discuss optimality, Pareto
dominance, etc. This is because under Ambiguity one needs to look at the impact of
beliefs of agents over the allocation of their resources. Finally, I do not claim to build
an argument at the highest level of mathematical rigor. I use simplifying assumptions to
shorten the exposition. Those assumptions are justified in the text, but I recognize that
some readers can be dissatisfied by my treatment.
CHAPTER 3
DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first presents the ideas of Risk and
Ambiguity in a neo-Bayesian framework following [Amarante, 2014]. The treatment
is not rigorous but still presents some important properties of Ambiguity. The second
section is an overview of Savage’s framework of subjective probability. The impacts of
imposing different axioms over the preference relation % is discussed. The third section
explains some properties of decision-making under Ambiguity
3.1 An intuitive notion of Risk and Ambiguity
This section aims to present the main ideas of two papers of Massimiliano Amarante,
"Foundations of neo-Bayesian statistics" [Amarante, 2009] and "What is Ambiguity?"
[Amarante, 2014]. We use loose citations and only write the pages when we refer to
"What is Ambiguity?". Our approach is limited but is sufficient for our purpose. We
strongly invite the reader to refer to the original papers.
As mentionned, Frank Knight, in his seminal book "Risk, Uncertainty and Profit"
[Frank Hyneman Knight, 1948], makes the distinction between Risk and what we now
call Knightian Uncertainty, or Ambiguity. Risk is a form of Uncertainty that is measur-
able, such as flipping a coin or rolling a dice. It is a situation where the information is
good enough to allow the decision-maker (DM) to describe all the possible states of the
world with a unique probability distribution. This probability distribution does not need
to be the "real" one; it could be purely subjective such as in a Bayesian setting.
On the other side, Knightian Uncertainty is a form of Uncertainty that is truly not
measurable, plagued by opacity. This is a situation where the information is not good
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enough to allow the DM to describe all the possible states of the world with a unique
probability distribution. In a neo-Bayesian settingm this Uncertainty is called Ambigu-
ity. More exactly, the DM considers multiple probability distributions as plausible, but
he is unable to pick only one of them. The three main ideas of "What is Ambiguity?" are
the following:
1- Risk and Ambiguity arise because of different structures of the information avail-
able to the DM.
2- Where the Uncertainty is of the Risk type, the utility representation of the DM is
additive. The family of additive utility functions is called SEU for Subjective Expected
Utility. The Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility is one of them, and this family admit all
possible Risk Attitudes.
3- Where the Uncertainty is of the Ambiguity type, the utility of the DM is non-
additive. The broad class of non-additive utility is called NEU for non-Expected Utility.
The SEU is a special case of these preferences. I refer to [Amarante, 2009] for a com-
plete treatment. Non-additive utilities allow for the idea of Ambiguity Attitude.
Let us frame this in a simple mathematical way. Let p be a probabilistic description
of all the states of the world and let P be the set of all p. Assume that P is non-empty,
compact and convex. If the information is good enough, then P is a singleton and it is
a situation of Risk. If the information is not good enough, then P contains two or more
elements and it is a situation of Ambiguity. The Ellsberg’s three-color urn experiment
is the simplest example of the difference between the two concepts [Amarante, 2014,
pp. 15-16].
Imagine there is an unobservable urn containing 90 balls distributed in a maximum
of three colors: red, black or yellow. The DM knows the urn contains exactly 30 red
balls, but he does not have any information about the distribution of the black or yellow
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balls. He can place a bet on one color to get picked and receive a payoff of x. The prob-
ability of picking a red ball is p(r) = 30/90 = 1/3. Here, P(r) is a singleton and this
Uncertainty is a situation of Risk. On the other hand, the probability of picking a black
ball is not unique and can be described as the set P(b) = [0,1/90,2/90, . . . ,60/90] 1.
Such a set of probability distributions characterises Ambiguity in its simplest form.
Let u(p,x) be one SEU for a probability distribution p with finite payoff x. Observe
that u(p,x) is strictly increasing in p. Let U be the set of all u(p,x) for all p∈P. Observe
that U is closed. A NEU will be a decision rule such as the followings:
- Maxmin Expected Utility (MinEU): MinEU = infU where inf stands for infimum.
In the Ellsberg’s urn example, the MinEU of betting on a black ball is infU = u(0∗X).
The Maxmin Expected Utility comes from the preference relation that exhibits Ambigu-
ity Aversion.
- Maxmax Expected Utility (MaxEU): MaxEU = supU where sup stands for supre-
mum. In the Ellsberg’s urn example, the MaxEU of betting on a black ball is supU =
u((2/3) ∗X). The Maxmax Expected Utility comes from the preference relation that
exhibits Ambiguity Loving.
- Alpha-Max Expected Utility: αEU = α ∗ infU +(1−α) ∗ supU where α stands
for a coefficient of Ambiguity Aversion. The two Utility functions above are special
cases of the αEU where α = 1 and α = 0 respectively. In the Ellsberg’s urn example,
the αEU of betting on a black ball is αEU = α ∗u(0∗X)+(1−α)∗u((2/3)∗X).
One of the main characteristics of these representations is that Risk Aversion and
Ambiguity Aversion are two different and complementary concepts. Risk Aversion re-
lates to the inability of knowing Ex-Ante which state of the world one would have Ex-
Post. Ambiguity Aversion relates to the inability to have reliable knowledge on the
1. I assume that P(b) is equal to the superset of all possible P(b).
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process that picks the states of the world.
This relationship is very important. I personally consider Risk as a situation of first
order Uncertainty. When a DM flips a coin he does not know in advance if he will get
heads or tails. But he knows how to describe the relationship between the different states
of the world and could safely assume that the probability of heads is one-half. But Am-
biguity is a situation of deeper Uncertainty. The fact that the DM is unable to describe
the exact relationship between the different states of the world could be understood as a
form of second order Uncertainty. This is the reason why the Ambiguous Utility func-
tions above are defined on a set of priors. This is also why behaviour under Risk is
qualitatively and quantitatively different than behaviour under Ambiguity.
3.2 Invariant Biseparable preferences
Before going further I would like to comment the αEU presented above. This is
a simplified version of those characterised in [Ghirardato et al., 2004] and [Amarante,
2009]. It is implicitly assumed that the coefficient α is a constant, but it is usually a
function of the payoff. For example, a DM could be more Ambiguity Loving when he
faces gains than losses, a situation not considered in the version above. I overlooked
the preference relation % by assuming that the axioms of [Ghirardato et al., 2004] were
respected and avoided any discussion of priors. My objective was to build a simple tool
where one only needs to determine the best-case and worst-case scenario of a decision
under Ambiguity. In other words, I only need to define the bounds of the set U to use the
αEU . But the last model of this essay explicitly looks at the preference relation % and
I need to expose the general idea. The presentation follows [Amarante, 2014] treatment
and is almost identical to the pages 4 and 5.
In Savage’s framework of [Savage, 1954], the alternatives available to the DM is a
mapping (S, Σ) 7−→ X where (S, Σ) is a measurable space of states of the world and X
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is a space of consequences. 2 Considers the set of all alternatives A with at least one
constant alternative Ac. Let denote some alternatives in this set as f , g, h ∈A , and one
constant alternative as i ∈ Ac. This constant alternative gives the same payoff x for all
the possible states of the world. The preference relation % of the decision-maker is de-
fined on the set of alternatives A . In [Ghirardato et al., 2004], the authors identify a
large class of preference relations that they call Invariant Biseparable preferences. These
preferences share five axioms on the preference relation % and it is the imposition of the
sixth axiom that determines which Utility function obtains. These 5 common axioms are
the following:
A1 - Completion and transitivity The relation % is complete and transitive.
A2- C-independence For all f , g ∈A , for all i ∈Ac and for all α ∈ (0, 1)
f  g⇐⇒ α f +(1−α)i αg+(1−α)i
A3 - Archimedean property For all f , g, h ∈ A , if f  g and g  h then there exist
some α, β ∈ (0,1) such that α f +(1−α)h g and β f +(1−β )h≺ g.
A4 - Monotonicity For all f , g ∈A , if f (s)% g(s) for every states of the worlds s ∈ S,
then f % g.
A5 - Non-degeneracy There exist at least one set of consequences x, y ∈ X such that
x y.
In his article [Amarante, 2014] Amarante shows that the imposition of the sixth
axiom depends on the quality of the information available to the decision-maker. A
decision-maker with Invariant Biseparable preferences intends to maximise his Subjec-
tive Expected Utility. If the information is good enough, it is a situation of Risk with the
2. For completeness, Σ is the metric of the space of states of the world.
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following sixth Axiom:
A6 (a) - SEU For all f , g ∈A such that f ∼ g, f/2+g/2∼ f .
But when the information is not good enough it is a situation of Ambiguity and Ax-
iom 6(a) cannot be imposed. The decision-maker can have different Ambiguity Attitudes
that manifests in the preference relation %. The sixth Axioms that gives the MaxMin Ex-
pected Utility (MinEU) and the MaxMax Expected Utility (MaxEU) are:
A6 (b) - MinEU For all f , g ∈A such that f ∼ g, f/2+g/2 % f .
A6 (c) - MaxEU For all f , g ∈A such that f ∼ g, f/2+g/2 - f .
Consider IAA( f ) the Ambiguity Averse Utility function that respects axioms A1
to A6 (b). It could be shown that IAA( f ) is concave in alternatives f . Furthermore,
IAA( f ) exhibits superadditivity such that IAA( f +g)≥IAA( f )+IAA(g). Let IAL( f )
be the Ambiguity Loving Utility function that respect axioms A1 to A6(c). It could be
shown that IAL( f ) is convex in alternative f and that it exhibits subadditivity such that
IAL( f +g)≤IAL( f )+IAL(g).
3.3 Some characteristics of Ambiguity
By now it is possible to present more general properties of decision-making under
Ambiguity. Let us consider two hypothetical scenarios. The first is an extension of Ells-
berg’s Urn experiment. Imagine that the DM can make a second bet, but this time he
can choose a second ball to combine with the black ball. He can now bet either on black
and yellow or on black and red. The probability of picking a black or a yellow ball is
p(b∪y) = 1− p(r) = 2/3. On the other hand, the probability of picking a black or a red
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ball could be considered as the set P(b∪ r) = [1/3,31/90,32/90, ...,89/90,90]. 3
In the second hypothetical scenario, the DM is an investor that faces a multiplicity
of projects into which he can put his money. These projects are plagued by a high level
of Uncertainty. He knows that if a project succeeds he will receive a very big return on
his investment. But if the project fails he will lose his money. Assume that the DM is
unable to define one subjective probability of success for each of the projects. That is, he
has a multiplicity of priors over the probability of success for all the research projects.
Therefore he is unable to make up his mind and compute a unique SEU for the return on
investment. His outside (constant) alternative is to invest in a risk-free asset that pays a
modest return. Four of the most fundamental properties of Ambiguity can now be stated.
1- Ambiguity is not a problem of compound lotteries. We cannot reasonably assume
a probability distribution over the different priors to solve the conceptual problem that
creates Ambiguity. In Ellsberg’s Urn experiment, assuming that all the probability dis-
tributions of having a black ball are equally likely turns the problem into a compound
lottery (remember that P(b) = [0,1/90, ...,2/3]). That is, assuming a "meta-probability"
turns the initial problem into a complex situation of Risk and expels considerations about
the second order Uncertainty. Assuming such "meta-probability" is arbitrary and does
not give new insights on decision-making under Uncertainty. In the second thought ex-
periments, a "meta-probability" transforms the portfolio choice into a simple situation
of maximising the SEU of profit according to the investor’s Risk Attitude and budget
constraint.
2- An Ambiguity Averse (AA) decision-maker has a proclivity toward Risk and the
constant alternative. In Ellsberg’s Urn experiment the AA DM prefers to bet on the red
ball if he can choose one ball. This could be deduced by comparing his SEU of a red
ball to his MinEU of a black ball: EU(r) = u((1/3)∗X)≥ u(0∗X) = MinEU(b). But
3. Again, I assume that the set P(b∪ r) that the DM consider is equal to the superset of all possible
P(b∪ r).
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when offered the possibility to bet on two balls he prefers the black and yellow because
EU(b∪ y) = u((2/3)∗X)≥ u((1/3)∗X) = MinEU(b∪ r). The AA DM hedges Ambi-
guity by mixing. Looking at axiom A6 (b), it is clear that the DM is indifferent between
betting on a black or yellow ball, but prefers to bet on a mix of the two. In the second
thought experiment, Ambiguity Aversion leads to two different results that depend on
thestructure of his belief. The first possibility is that the DM chooses the risk-free asset
and invest nothing in ambiguous projects. The second possibility is that the DM will
hedge the Ambiguity by investing a small amount into a lot of projects. This happens
when the structure of the beliefs allows the Utility function IAA( f ) to be concave in the
alternative f of investing in a ambiguous asset. Therefore, IAA( f ) exhibits superaddi-
tivity such that IAA( f +g)≥IAA( f )+IAA(g) for all ambiguous assets f , g.
3- An Ambiguity Loving (AL) DM has a proclivity toward Ambiguity. In Ellsberg’s
Urn experiment the AL DM prefers to bet on the black ball if he can only choose one ball.
This could be deduced by comparing his SEU of a red ball to his MaxEU of a black ball:
EU(r) = u((1/3)∗X)< u((2/3)∗X) = MaxEU(b). When offered to bet on two balls,
he prefers black and red because EU(b∪y) = u((2/3)∗X)< u(1∗X) = MaxEU(b∪ r).
Looking at axiom A6 (c), it is clear that the DM is indifferent between betting on a black
or yellow ball in combination with a red ball, but does not prefer to bet on a mix. This
proclivity not to mix is reflected in the second thought experiment by a tendency to invest
a large amount of money in a small number of projects. This comes from the fact that
IAL( f ) is convex in the alternative f and therefore exhibits subadditivity for multiple
investments.
4- A lot of Utility functions stemming from Invariant Biseparable preferences are not
differentiable in the usual sense. It is not essential to present the mathematical properties
of those functions but they may pose difficulties to standard analysis. In particular, non-
differentiability may preclude the application of the equimarginal principle, where the
marginal utility of an intrant should be equal to the marginal utility of all other intrants.
CHAPTER 4
THE BASIC MODEL
4.1 Aghion and Tirole’s model under Risk
The basic model of Aghion and Tirole [Aghion and Tirole, 1994] 1 is as follows.
There are two agents, a Research Unit (RU) and a Costumer (C). Only the Research
Unit can conduct the research and it is cash constrained. The Research Unit input is its
effort e, which is assumed not to be contractible. In the original paper the Customer is
a monopoly in a good market but I will simply consider him as an investor. Its input E
is assumed to be contractible. Aghion and Tirole suggest that E could be money, access
to a patent pool, expertise of the Customer, etc. Here, it is assumed that E is money
because the impacts of patents will be covered in chapter 5. The research technology is
modelled as a probability of discovery P(e,E) that is an increasing function of e and E.
The research technology has standard concavity properties:
∂eP(e, E)> 0 ∂ 2e P(e, E)< 0 ∂EP(e, E)> 0 ∂
2
EP(e, E)< 0
∂eP̂(0, E) = ∞ ∂E P̂(e, 0) = ∞
I use P̂(0) to make explicit the fact that the productivity is infinite at a level of 0
input e or E. However, let standardize the minimal level of e or E at zero and henceforth
write P(0, 0) as the probability of discovery at the minimum imaginable level of input.
Finally, Aghion and Tirole consider that P(e, E)< 1 in the relevant range. Without loss
of generality they assume that the cost of e and E is linear and that both agents are Risk-




P(e, E)∗V − e−E
1. This section is almost identical to the pp. 1185 to 1192 of the article. I slightly changed the notation.
2. They do not model the consumer surplus in the paper.
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Which yields the first-best solution of :
∂eP(e, E)∗V = ∂EP(e, E)∗V = 1 (4.1)
To look at the market outcome of R&D they need to make a crucial assumption.
They assume that both agents consider the sharing-rule of the profit to be renegotiable
Ex-Post. The determination of the Ex-Post sharing rule will therefore follow a Rubin-
stein bargaining process [Rubinstein, 1982]. The equilibrium solution of this bargaining
problem is to split the pot in half and gives each agent V/2. The agents anticipate this
Ex-Post equilibrium and disregard any other Ex-Ante sharing rule. I do not agree with
this hypothesis and try to propose an alternative approach in section 4.3. However, this
assumption is useful because it makes clear that a property right is a discrete entity that
pertains either to the Research Unit or to the Customer. When the Customer owns the




UCC = P(e, E)∗V −E
Which yields:
∂EP(e, E)∗V = 1 (4.2)
This solution correspond to the first-best investment E of equation (4.1). The super-
script of U stands for an index of the owners of the innovation and the subscript identifies
the agents. On the other hand, the Research Unit receives no incentives at all and there-
fore puts its minimal level of effort 0. Writing E∗(V ) as the equilibrium investment as a
function of V defined in equation (4.2), the Expected Utility of the two agents are:
UCRU = 0 (4.3)
UCC = P(0, E
∗(V ))∗V −E∗(V ) (4.4)
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When the Research Unit owns the innovation it maximises:
Maximise
e
URURU = P(e, E)∗V/2− e
Which yields:
∂eP(e, E)∗V/2 = 1 (4.5)
That is written as e∗(V/2). By the same argument the optimal investment of the Cus-
tomer is E∗(V/2). Both e∗(V/2) and E∗(V/2) are sub-optimal with regard to the first-
best solution defined in equation (4.1). The Expected Utility of the two agents are the
following:
URURU = P(e
∗(V/2), E∗(V/2))∗V/2− e∗(V/2)> 0 (4.6)
URUC = P(e
∗(V/2), E∗(V/2))∗V/2−E∗(V/2) (4.7)
Equation (4.6) implies that the Research Unit always prefers owning the property
rights. This fact will be useful later. But what does the Customer prefer? Clearly, if
URUC >U
C
C then the Customer will let the property rights go to the Research Unit. But if
URUC <U
C
C then the Customer wants to own the innovation. The property rights allocation
will then be determined by the Ex-Ante bargaining power of the two parties. If the Re-
search Unit have the bargaining power it will always keep the property rights to itself. In






C , then the Research Unit allocates the property rights
efficiently and it is a second-best equilibrium. If the Customer has the bargaining power
and URUC <U
C
C , he allocates the property rights to himself because the Research Unit is











then this allocation is an inefficient equilibrium that is sub-optimal, even compared to a
second-best equilibrium. In the words of Aghion and Tirole, the allocation of the prop-
erty rights does not only affect the distribution of the pie but also its size.
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4.1.1 Critique of the model
I would like to give my interpretation of the assumption that the probability of dis-
covery P(e, E) is objective, given and known by the two agents. This assumption implies
that there exists in the real world a unique probability that specific individuals in a spe-
cific period of time will have a specific idea. This idea, that nobody else in the economy
already had, requires a certain amount of input as money and effort to come into the
world. Furthermore, there exists a very specific relationship between the quantity of
money and effort invested and the probability of discovery. Both agents know this rela-
tionship, know that the other knows, and they can agree on a contract that depends on
the exact form it takes.
I believe that the conclusions of the model are somewhat embedded in this single as-
sumption. If there exists a single objective function of discovery known by both agents
their decisions will be almost exclusively determined by it. The Uncertainty here is of
the same type as flipping a coin or rolling dice, and decision-makers only need to choose
how much they are willing to bet on a pair of sixes. Considering an objective probability
of discovery leaves little or no space for human decisions or interactions. In other words,
there are no qualitative nor quantitative differences between the choices that venture cap-
italists or compulsive gamblers face.
The remainder of this chapter tries to lift the assumption that the technology of re-
search P(e, E) is given and objective. To be fair, I consider that Aghion and Tirole’s
model is very clear and gives us important insights. I intend to keep its essence. I will
understand it as a benchmark case when the two agents maximise their SEU and share
a common prior. However, I allow the agents to disagree on their subjective assessment
of the probability of discovery. The next section aims to understand the impact of these
disagreements on the allocation of the property rights.
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4.2 Introducing "Ambiguity" in the model
As said, Aghion and Tirole frame their model in the context of an objective proba-
bility of discovery and assume standard Expected utility functions. The model could be
translated in the context of Savage’s framework by assuming that the two agents share a
common prior. But the objective of this presentation is to introduce some "Ambiguity"
in this model. Therefore, let us assume that the two agents are SEU maximisers, but let
us also allow them to diverge on their assessment of the probability of discovery. The
approach in this section is not a proper model of decision-making under Ambiguity; it is
a model of heterogeneous beliefs where the agents agree to disagree. This reformulation
of Aghion and Tirole’s model allows us to look at the impact of divergences in beliefs
on the allocation of the property rights. This, without the need to introduce a lot of new
notation. There is a natural correspondence between what I present here and Ambiguity
and I will make this relationship explicit throughout the text.
Let us consider three different functions P(e, E) such that PL(e, E) < P(e, E) <
PH(e, E) for all e and E. Here, the subscript L stands for Low probability of discovery,
the subscript H stands for High probability of discovery and the absence of subscript
means that we use the same P(e, E) as Aghion and Tirole. Therefore, we have a set of
three different priors that the decision-makers can believe. An agent that is "pessimistic"
adopts the Low probability prior, and an agent that his "optimistic" adopts the High
probability. We have that ∂ePL(e, E)< ∂eP(e, E)< ∂ePH(e, E) for all e. It immediately
follows that e∗L(V/2)< e
∗(V/2)< e∗H(V/2). We say that the more "optimistic" the Re-
search Unit is, the more he is willing to invest in the project. The same result holds for
the input E of the Customer.
The relation of this model to a situation of Ambiguity is already clear if we under-
stand the set {P(e, E)} as a set of priors. Assuming that there are no outside options
(constant alternatives) and no possibilities for the agents to mix, the "pessimistic" type
is an Ambiguity Averse decision-maker and the "optimistic" type is Ambiguity Loving .
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We can also understand the agent that believes in P(e, E) as a SEU maximiser, or some-
body that does not perceive Ambiguity. For the remainder of this chapter I will therefore
refer to the three types of agent using their corresponding Ambiguity Attitude. It is an
abuse of nomenclature that will become useful in chapter 5.
4.2.1 Under Common Knowledge
To start let us assume that both agents know the Ambiguity Attitude (type) of their
partner. That is, let us assume some form of Common Knowledge, where an agent
knows the belief of the other. Recall that by equation (4.6) above the Research Unit al-
ways prefers to own the property rights of the innovation. Therefore, it is only necessary
to look at the impact of a divergence of beliefs on the Customer’s incentives to keep or
let go the property rights. It is trivial to see that when both agents are of the same type
they have a common prior in the set {P(e, E)}. In this situation we obtain the model of
Aghion and Tirole but with a different probability distribution.
Let a∈A be the Ambiguity Attitude of the Research Unit and b∈B be the Ambiguity
Attitude of the Customer. Here, A=B := {Amb. Averse, Amb. "Neutral", Amb. Loving}.
By a second abuse of notation let us use the subscript of the probability of discovery to
index the Ambiguity Attitude of the agents. Therefore, if Cb stands for the general Am-
biguity Attitude of the Customer, CL means that he is Ambiguity Averse, CH means that
he is Ambiguity Loving and C means that he considers P(e,E). The same goes for the
Research Unit. Therefore, URUC |CL,RU is understood as "the Utility of the Customer when
the Customer is Ambiguity Averse and the Research Unit is Ambiguity Neutral".
Let us first consider the Customer’s Subjective Expected Utility when he owns the
property rights. The Research Unit put his minimal level of effort, standardised at 0. The
Customer’s SEU is therefore:
UCC |Cb,RUa = Pb(0, E
∗
b(V ))∗V −E∗b(V )
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This level of Utility needs to be compared to the Customer’s Utility when the Research
Unit owns the property rights, which is:





When the agents disagree then one will be more optimistic than the other. This gives us
two general situations that could be expressed in two propositions.
Proposition 1: The more the Customer is Ambiguity Averse in comparison to the
Research Unit, the more incentives the Customer will have to let the property rights go.
This comes from two facts: A- The Customer considers that the Research Unit will over-
invest in the research project with regard to the Customer’s belief about the probability
of discovery. In other words, the Customer considers that allocating the property rights
to the Research Unit gives him more incentives than in the standard model. B- A lower
probability of discovery P(e, E) implies a lower level of effort E for the Customer. This
is true whoever owns the property rights. Therefore, the more Ambiguity Averse the
Customer is, the less he wants to invest in the project. This gives him a strong incentive
to surrender the property rights.
1- Case A: The customer is Ambiguity Averse. He will compare his Utility when he
owns the property rights:
UCC |CL,RUa 6=L = PL(0, E
∗
L(V ))∗V −E∗L(V ) (4.8)
with the utility he would have by letting the Research Unit own the property rights:
URUC |CL,RU = PL(e
∗(V/2), E∗L(V/2))∗V/2−E∗L(V/2) (4.9)





1- Case B: The customer is Ambiguity "Neutral" and maximises his Subjective Ex-
pected Utility with regard to P(e, E). He will compare his Utility when he owns the
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property rights:
UCC |C,RUH = P(0, E
∗(V ))∗V −E∗(V ) (4.11)
with the Utility he would have by letting the Research Unit own the property rights:




These equations show the importance of the Common Knowledge hypothesis. Equa-
tion (4.10) implies that the Customer will invest very little money in the project and still
receive V/2 if there is a discovery. In other words, the Customer benefits a lot from
the Ambiguity Loving attitude of the Research Unit. Without the Common Knowledge
assumption this becomes a strategic situation. Let us come back on this possibility later.
Proposition 2: The more the Customer is Ambiguity Loving in comparison to the
Research Unit, the more incentives the Customer will have to keep the property rights.
This comes from two facts: A- The Customer considers that the Research Unit will
under-invest in the research project with regard to the Customer’s belief about the prob-
ability of discovery. In other words, the Customer considers that allocating the property
rights to the Research Unit gives him less incentives than in the standard model. B-
A higher probability of discovery implies a higher level of effort E for the Customer.
Therefore, the more Ambiguity Loving the Customer is, the more he wants to invest in
the project and the more incentives he has to keep the property rights.
2- Case C: The customer is Ambiguity Loving. He will compare his Utility when he
owns the property rights:
UCC |CH ,RUa6=H = PH(0, E
∗
H(V ))∗V −E∗H(V ) (4.13)
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with the utility he would have by letting the Research Unit own the property rights:





URUC |CH ,RU = PH(e
∗(V/2), E∗H(V/2))∗V/2−E∗H(V/2) (4.15)
2- Case D: The customer is Ambiguity "Neutral" and maximises his Subjective Ex-
pected Utility with regard to P(e, E). He will compare his Utility when he owns the
property rights:
UCC |C,RUL = P(0, E
∗(V ))∗V −E∗(V ) (4.16)
with the utility he would have by letting the Research Unit own the property rights:




Finally, let us consider a fourth possible type of Customer. This new type is a mix
between the "pessimistic" and the "optimistic". That is, let us consider the αMaxMin
Expected Utility (αEU). Assume that the fourth type chooses a level of effort Eα in
between the two opposite optimal level, E∗L and E
∗
H . There are two possible levels of










α|C stands for "the level of effort E for an αEU Customer knowing that the
Customer owns the property rights". Here, α represents the degree of "pessimism"/
Ambiguity Aversion. The Customer’s Utility when he owns the property rights is:









αEUCC = α[PL(0, E
∗

































Taking equation (4.18) and equation (4.19) together show that for any Ambiguity At-
titude α of the Research Unit there will be a "tipping point" where the Customer will
either prefer to keep or to relinquish the property rights.
4.2.2 Without Common Knowledge
Let us now lift the assumption of Common Knowledge. Remember that in any sit-
uation the Research Unit prefers to have the property rights. Therefore the RU have a
strong incentive to show that it is the optimistic/Ambiguity Loving type. This type is
hard-working and invest the highest level of effort e∗(V/2), which gives more incentives
to the Customer to surrender the property rights. If the Research Unit has a signalling
device this situation is identical to the analysis of the previous subsection. But if he does
not have a signalling device then it is a situation of Cheap Talk where the Research Unit
has no credibility. Therefore, the Customer will act according to his own beliefs over the
type of the Research Unit. Let again a ∈ A stands for the Ambiguity Attitude of the Re-
search Unit such that A := {Amb. Averse, Amb. "Neutral", Amb. Loving}. Remember
that if the Customer owns the property rights its Utility is:
UCC |Cb,RUa = Pb(0, E
∗
b(V ))∗V −E∗b(V ) (4.20)
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Case E: Assume that the Customer has a prior ΠA over the types A of the Research
Unit. Therefore, πa is the probability that the Customer accords to the Research Unit of
being the type a ∈ A. The Utility of the Customer for letting go the property rights is :
URUC (ΠA)|Cb = ∑
a∈A
πa ∗ [Pb(e∗a(V/2), E∗b(V/2))∗V/2]−E∗b(V/2) (4.21)
which is to be compared to equation (4.20). This is a standard situation of maximisation
of Subjective Expected Utility.
Case F: Finally, consider that the Customer is unable to have a prior ΠA over the
Research Unit type. That is, the Customer faces some form of "Ambiguity". At the
exception of the αEU , the choice of the Customer will be "as if" the two agents where
of the same type/Ambiguity Attitude. In other words, it is "as if" they shared a common
prior. A pessimistic Customer will consider that the Research Unit is pessimistic, and
vice-versa. The Ambiguity Averse Customer Utility is:





And the Ambiguity Loving Customer Utility:





Those two equations have to be compared to equation (4.20). Because in the belief
of the Customer the two agents are of the same type, the analysis collapses in the same
problem than the basic model of Aghion and Tirole. The only difference is that the Cus-
tomer considers other probabilities of discovery than P(e, E).
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4.3 Endogenous sharing rule
In the section II.4 of their article (pp.1192-1195) Aghion and Tirole allow for co-
financing by multiple investors. This transforms the choice of the allocation of the prop-
erty from a discrete to a continuous one. I would like to emulate their idea but use a
different approach. Their basic model could be understood as a game with the following
form:
1- Nature - Determines the bargaining power of the two parties.
2- The agents choose the property rights allocation and the Ex-Ante sharing rule V .
3- The agents choose their respective efforts e,E.
4- Nature - Discovery or not.
5- Renegotiation of the sharing rule V .
In this game, Aghion and Tirole consider that the only re-bargaining solution of step
five is V/2. They justify this stance using Rubinstein’s paper on Perfect Equilibrium of
a Bargaining Game [Rubinstein, 1982]. The agents therefore regard V/2 as the Ex-Ante
sharing rule because it seems to be renegotiable Ex-Post.
I believe that this is an incomplete story. It is clear that the sharing rule determines
the incentives to invest. In the words of Aghion and Tirole, the allocation of the property
rights affects not only the distribution of the pie but also its size. Therefore, both agents
should recognized that they will be better off if they can choose an optimal sharing rule
Ex-Ante and stick to it. If they can commit to this Ex-Ante sharing rule then V/2 is not
necessarily sub-game perfect. 3 Assuming they have an effective commitment device I
want to look at the following game:
3. It should be noted that in Rubinstein’s paper the size of the pie is given before the bargaining
process.
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1- Nature - Determines the bargaining power of the two parties.
2- The agents choose the property rights allocation and the Ex-Ante sharing rule V .
3- The agents choose their respective efforts e,E.
4- Nature - Discovery or not.
5- No renegotiation.
Which collapses in steps 1 to 4. Before continuing further I want to apologise to the
reader. Due to my limited knowledge of Game Theory I proved unable to work out the
Nash Equilibrium of this game. I do not know if there exists a unique equilibrium or
if multiple equilibriums can arise. In particular, I am unable to determine whether the
bargaining power of the parties is relevant or not. It seems possible that perfectly rational
agents can find a solution to the game without the requirement of one of them imposing
his will. But if the bargaining power reveals to determine the equilibrium its impact
seem to be weakened when the agents can choose their business partners. I present this
possibility in the next chapter.
4.3.1 Nash Equilibrium in the Bayesian game
Let the sharing rule x ∈ X = [0,1] be the part of the revenue V that goes to the
Customer 4. When x = 1 it is the same situation as in the previous chapter; the Customer
is the owner of the innovation and the Research Unit put e = 0 effort. Remember that
e = 0 was standardised as the minimal level of effort possible. But remember also that
the Research Unit was cash constrained and could not pay for a "minimal level of effort
E". Therefore, let us exclude from the analysis the possibility that x = 0. For simplicity,
let us assume that the agent with the biggest share of V owns the property rights. After
all, intellectual property is always a discrete entity that pertains to only one agent. It
should also be assumed that when x = 0.5 the agents have a mechanism to ascribe the
4. Let keep the term Customer to stay in line with the previous sections. However, the model could
be extended to a situation of co-financing by m investors, with the investors j ∈ J receiving x j ∗V and
investing the level of effort E∗j (x j ∗V ).
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property rights to one of them. In step 3 we have the Customer’s problem:
Maximise
E
UC = x∗P(e, E)∗V −E
which yields:
x∗∂EP(e, E)∗V = 1 (4.24)
and the Research Unit problem:
Maximise
e
URU = (1− x)∗P(e, E)∗V − e
which yields:
(1− x)∗∂EP(e, E)∗V = 1 (4.25)
From equation (4.24) and (4.25) let us write the optimal levels of effort as E∗(x∗V )
and e∗((1− x) ∗V ) respectively. It is trivial to see that ∂xE∗(x ∗V ) > 0 and ∂xe∗((1−
x)∗V )< 0. That is, the optimal investment/effort of the agents is an increasing function
of their share of V . Now the problem is to find if there exists an x∗ ∈ X such that
simultaneously UC(x∗)>UC(x) and URU(x∗)>URU(x) for all x∈X . The Utility function
of the players are:
UC(x∗) = x∗ ∗P(e∗((1− x∗)∗V ), E∗(x∗ ∗V ))−E∗(x∗ ∗V )
UC(x) = x∗P(e∗((1− x)∗V ), E∗(x∗V ))−E ∗ (x∗V )
URU(x∗) = (1− x∗)∗P(e∗((1− x∗)∗V ), E∗(x∗ ∗V ))− e∗((1− x∗)∗V )
URU(x) = (1− x)∗P(e∗((1− x)∗V ), E∗(x∗V ))− e∗((1− x)∗V )
And this is where my limited knowledge becomes a vexation. For the two agents,
a higher part of the revenue V means a higher profit, but only in a certain range. The
agents need to recognise the incentives effect of giving more benefits to their partners.






E. With this research technology the two optimal level of effort are
e∗= ((1−x)∗V/2)2 and E∗= (xV/2)∗2. Substituting in the Customer’s Utility function
gives:
UC(x) =V 2/2∗ (x− x2/2)
a simple parabola that passes through 0 and reaches its maximum at x = 1. The Research
Unit’s Utility is:
URU(x) =V 2/4∗ (1− x2)
which is maximised at x = 0. Total surplus UC(x)+URU(x) is maximised at x = 0.5.
In this benchmark situation, each agent prefers to own the innovation, but total surplus
is maximised at V/2. It is trivial to see that whenever the two agents are equally pro-
ductive the total surplus is maximised at x = 0.5. Working the same calculation with
P(e, E) = e1/3 +E1/3 it is possible to show that UC(x) is maximised at x = 0.88 and
URU(x) is maximised at x = 0.12. The more productive the agents are, the smaller the
range that the Nash Equilibrium x∗ might be. In other words, higher productivity gives
incentives to share more equally.
It is unfortunate that I, the writer, am unable to characterize the Nash Equilibrium of
this game. I would like to model "Ambiguity" using different probabilities of discovery
and look at their impact on equilibrium. Let’s take for example a situation of asymmetric





E and chooses the optimal effort e∗ = ((1−x)V/2)2. But now assume
that the Customer believes that P(e, E) = e1/3 +E1/3 and chooses E∗ = (x ∗V/3)3/2.
That is, the Customer is more optimistic about the probability of discovery than the
Research Unit. Assuming Common Knowledge, the Utility of the two agents are:
UC(x) = x∗V ∗ (((1− x)V/2)2/3 +(x∗V/3)1/2)− (x∗V/3)3/2
URU(x) = (1− x)∗V (((1− x)V/2)+(x∗V/3)3)− ((1− x)V/2)2
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Drawing from the intuition of the previous sections, I conjecture that there will be
at least two important considerations in the choice of x. To start, the agents will choose
independently their level of effort according to their own beliefs. This means that for any
sharing rule x, the Customer considers that the Research Unit will under-invest relative
to the Customer’s belief about the productivity of e. Alternatively, the Research Unit
considers that the Customer will over-invest relative to the Research Unit’s belief about
the productivity of E. Logically, this should give a strong incentive to both of the agents
to give a bigger share x of V to the Customer. However, I proved unable to solve this
problem. Therefore I will assume for the rest of this essay that this intuition holds in any
situation.
CHAPTER 5
A MARKET OF R&D
This final chapter will explore what happens to the allocation of property rights in
a market with multiple researchers and investors. The incentives of the agents are de-
scribed, but no equilibrium for the whole market is characterised. However, important
elements that affects the dynamic of this market are exposed. Essentially, this section
examines how three agents differs from each other in terms of bargaining power, incen-
tives and opportunities to make money.
Let us consider a one time R&D competition for an innovation. Assume a winner-
takes-all market, where only one firm wins the R&D competition and makes V in revenue
from the innovation. The specific source of this revenue does not need to be modelled;
it could comes from the possibility of establishing a monopoly in a good market or as
a prize in a competition held by an external party. The last possibility is interesting
because it allows a Social Planner to give incentives to firms to invest in R&D while
taking into account the Consumer Surplus of the innovation. Substantial changes to the
framework and notation of the previous chapter are required to fully capture the essence
of the market. Consider that there is n researchers that follow different research paths
or research projects. Assume that a researcher cannot pursue more than one research
path at a time. Therefore, let Ri be the researcher of the project i ∈ I such that |I| = n.
Let use i interchangeably to describe either the research projects i or the researcher i. It
is an abuse of notation but it simplifies the explanation. As in the previous section, a
researcher i invest his effort ei that is still assumed not to be contractible. But now let
standardize the minimal level of effort e for the research project to be viable as e0 instead
of 0.
On the other side of the market there is the investors. Consider a pool of m possi-
ble investors j that are interested in the research projects such that j ∈ J, |J| = m. The
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input of these investors is only money, a lump-sum payment of E made up-front. Let
standardise the minimum level of effort E as E0. This E0 is understood as the mini-
mum amount that covers the fixed costs of a research project. These fixed costs do not
include the wages of the researchers. Therefore, E0 and e0 are required to initiate the
research and any amount above this threshold augment the "probability of discovery"
in the same way than the previous sections. Every investor has a budget constraint b j
such that b j < ∞. The problem of investor j is to build a portfolio P j = ∑i∈I E j, i such
that P j ≤ b j. Finally, the total amount of money available for investment is B = ∑ j∈J b j.
The third agent is a firm with access to a patent pool that can help the research
projects. Such a firm could be an incumbent monopoly in the good market toward which
the innovation is oriented. For simplicity let consider only one firm, but the results are
easy to generalise. This firm has to decide whether it will allow the researchers i to ac-
cess the patent pool. Let write q = 0 or q = 1 the input of this firm, where q = 1 means
that the access is allowed. This patent pool augments the probability of a research project
to win the innovation race. Remember that in the model of Aghion and Tirole the effort
E of the Customer could be input in the form of expertise, patents and money. It is im-
portant to distinguish between these last two possibilities for three reasons. First, they
will have a different impact on the market. Second, I do not believe that giving access
to a patent pool is costly and, therefore I assume that the cost of q = 1 is zero. Third, it
is reasonable to model the investment of money as a continuous function, an assumption
that cannot be made for the patents.
To model Ambiguity in this innovation competition it is necessary to recall Sav-
age’s framework. Assume that for each research project i the probability of discovery
Pi(e, E, q) is ill-defined, but that ∑i∈I Pi(e,E,q)→ 1. For simplicity let assume that
∑i∈I Pi(e, E, q) = 1, which means that there will be one winner with certainty. Our
space of states of the world (S,Σ) contains n elements; this set (S,Σ) described each
possibility that firm i ∈ I wins. Of course, the space X of consequences described the
allocation of the revenue V to the winner i. What is left for analysis is the set of alterna-
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tives A and the impact that different Ambiguity Attitudes will have on the allocation of
property rights. Before going further let make an observation that will be useful in sec-
tion 2. The assumption that ∑i∈I Pi(e, E, q) = 1 implies that an investor who invests in
all the research projects i for a fixed claim x will receive x∗V with certainty. That is, the
ability to "cover" every research project i ∈ I eliminates the Uncertainty. Therefore, if
P j = ∑i∈I E j, i ≤ x∗V , the investors could want to buy all the research projects because
there is an opportunity for profit without any risk.
The first two sections consider the relationship between only two types of agent,
the researchers and the investors. Although the research technology is expressed as
P(e, E, q) for completeness, it is implicitly assumed that q = 0 until section three.
5.1 The researchers
A researcher i has three possibilities. First, he can opt-out of the innovation compe-
tition and go to work somewhere else. It is assumed that he does not need to make any
effort in this outside option, so e= 0. He will definitely receive the utility of U(e= 0), or
U(0). This level U(0) is a constant alternative in the set Ai. The participation constraint
for entering the innovation competition is therefore U(e > 0)>U(e = 0). Let consider a
second possibility for the researcher where he can strike a deal with some investors and
enter the competition as a simple worker. In other words, he can surrender the property
rights and any incentives to invest more than the minimal level of effort e0. In exchange
he is guaranteed to receive an amount of money such that U(e0 > 0)>U(0). Let express
this amount as the wage wi(e0) of the researcher i. If it is assumed that the researcher
can always take this kind of opportunity, then it gives a second constant alternative in
the set A . By construction, the outside option with e = 0 becomes irrelevant and the
only possibility that matter is the choice of e∗((1− x) ∗V ) ≥ e0. Remark however that
the participation constraint gives the researcher some bargaining power.
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Following the model of section 4.3, consider x the share that goes to the investor in
case of a discovery. The incentive constraint of the researcher is U(e((1− x) ∗V )) >
U(e0). But this alternative faces Uncertainty, and it is better to express the Utility func-
tion of the researcher as I i(e((1−x)∗V )) to make clear that he can consider Ambiguity.
Remember that the researcher cannot work in more than one project so there is no need
to worry about mixing. This case of decision-making under Uncertainty becomes quite
simple. The choice of the researcher will be determined by the exact structure of his
beliefs and by his Ambiguity Attitude. The first possibility is that the researcher is a
Subjective Expected Utility maximiser and considers only one prior over the probability
of discovery P(e, E, q). In this case, he will prefer the situation when he takes some
risks if and only if SEU(π, e∗((1− x∗)∗V ))>U(e0). 1 The left-hand side (LHS) of the
inequality makes it clear that this researcher maximises his Subjective Expected Utility
with regard to his prior π . This is a standard result. When the researcher faces Ambi-
guity he considers multiple priors π ∈ Π over the probability of discovery P(e, E, q).
Because the researcher cannot mix, an Ambiguity Averse researcher has the following
Utility:
I iAA(e((1− x)∗V )) = SEU(infπ ∈Π, e((1− x)∗V )) (5.1)
where the right-hand-side (RHS) of the equation means that the researcher only cares
about the lowest probability of discovery he believes possible. On the other hand, the
Ambiguity Averse researcher Utility function is:
I iAL(e((1− x)∗V )) = SEU(supπ ∈Π, e((1− x)∗V )) (5.2)
Equations (5.1) and (5.2) are in direct correspondence with the previous chapter, where
infπ ∈ Π is interpreted as PL and supπ ∈ Π as PH . Using the insights gained earlier it
is easy to look at the allocation of property rights and the incentives of the customer to
invest his effort e.
1. Again, risk with a lower-case r denotes a situation when an agent expose himself to Uncertainty but
where it is not specified whether it is Risk or Ambiguity.
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To start, remark that an Ambiguity Loving researcher prefers to own a large share of
the value (1− x)∗V . This researcher is likely to put a high-level of effort e, a tendency
that is magnified by the incentive effect of having a large share. The AL researcher wants
to own the property rights of the innovation. If he meets the right partner he will get at
least enough money to cover the fixed cost of the research. The AL researcher would like
to have an investment higher than E0, but he is reluctant to let go a big share of V . It will
be clear in the next section that the natural partners of AL researchers are AA investors.
I personally like to think about this type of researcher as an entrepreneur-innovator à la
Silicon Valley.
At the other side of the spectrum is the Ambiguity Averse researchers. Introduc-
ing the option of working for a fixed wage wi(e0) radically changes the model of the
previous chapter: the AA DM does not necessarily always prefer to own the property
rights of the innovation. Depending on the structure of their beliefs, some Ambiguity
Averse researchers will prefer to be a worker that receives a lump-sum wage of wi(e0).
This happens when SEU(infπ ∈ Π, e((1− x) ∗V )) < U(e0). But even the Ambiguity
Averse researchers that do prefer to own a claim over the value V of the innovation tend
to invest a low level of effort e. It takes a high level of incentive to make them do oth-
erwise, and even then the effort will be lower than the Ambiguity Loving researchers. It
is clear that the Ambiguity Averse researchers are more likely to relinquish the property
rights of the innovation. This feature is interesting because it nuances the results of tra-
ditional Principal-Agent approach. Under Risk, the incentives given to an agent almost
necessarily induces greater effort. This effort is discounted by the Risk Aversion of the
decision-makers. But in this model it is possible to have Risk-neutral but Ambiguity
Averse researchers for whom incentives are ineffective.
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5.2 The investors
The analysis on the investors side is the reason why it was necessary to introduce
Savage’s framework in its entirety. Up to this point it could had been assumed that
agents were maximising their Subjective Expected Utility but with different priors and
yet obtain the same kind of results. It is not true for this section. Assume that there exists
in the economy a risk-free asset that pays with certainty (1+ r) ∗E, where r stand for
the interest rate. 2 Investing in this risk-free asset is the constant alternative Ac of the
set A of the investors. It defines the reservation Utility of the investors. The important
difference between them and the researchers is their ability to invest in more than one
research project. Assuming continuity, the investors’ space of alternatives is a vector in
IRn+1 that is bounded by their budget constraint. Here, the alternative f is to invest into
a research project i.
Now let us examine the preference relation % over these alternatives. To start, assume
that the investors consider every research project i as "equally likely" to win the innova-
tion race. 3 That is, assume that their preferences is such that f ∼ g for all f , g∈A \Ac.
In other words, f ∼ g for all the project i ∈ I. It is easy to check that the axioms A1
to A5 of chapter two are verified. The sixth axiom that determines the Ambiguity At-
titude of the investors can now be imposed. By definition, an investor is a Subjective
Expected Utility maximiser if simultaneously f ∼ g and g/2+ h/2 ∼ h holds. In this
particular case, a SEU investor wants to construct an optimal portfolio according to a uni-
form prior. This is a standard problem, with the specificity that it is possible to make the
revenue x∗V with certainty by adopting the strategy described at the start of this chapter.
At one extreme there are the Ambiguity Averse investors. By axiom A6(b), a decision-
maker is Ambiguity Averse if simultaneously f ∼ g and f/2+g/2% f holds. Remember
2. It is possible to add to this model a Risky asset that pays (1+ r + z) ∗E in Expectation, where z
stands for a Risk premium over the interest rate. However, I do not think that any insights can be gain
from this assumption.
3. The words "equally likely" are in quotation mark because it should not be interpreted as a uniform
prior.
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that this axiom leads to a Utility function I jAA( f ) that is concave in f and exhibits su-




AA(g). Of course, the choice of the
Ambiguity Averse investor will depend on the exact structure of his beliefs. If he his
pessimistic enough, he will strictly prefer to invest all his money in the risk-free asset
and stay out of the innovation competition. This happens when I jAA( f
′)<U((1+ r)E),
where f ′ represents any combination of investment in the research projects. But the AA
investors that stay in the market want to hedge Ambiguity by investing less money in
more research projects. Those investors’ portfolios will be highly diversified. It is possi-
ble that some of them will want to invest in every research project. However, by the intu-
ition developed in the previous chapters, the AA investors will not be able to negotiate a
high share x of the value V . Furthermore, those AA investors are unlikely to hire the AA
researchers for a fixed wage wi(e0). The wages augment the fixed costs of the research
project and the AA investors want to keep it low. On the other hand, those investors
like the Ambiguity Loving researchers; they consider that those researchers over-invest
their effort e in the project. This gives a simple coupling of two partners, where both
agents agree to give the property rights of the innovation to the AL researcher. The AA
investors finance at least the fixed cost of the research project in exchange for a relatively
small claim x of the revenue V .
At the other extreme are the Ambiguity Loving investors. By axiom A6(c), a decision-
maker is Ambiguity Loving if simultaneously g∼ h and g/2+h/2- h holds. Remember
that the Utility function I jAL( f ) is convex in alternative f and exhibits subadditivity such




AL(g). The Ambiguity Loving investors have a tendency
to invest more money in fewer research projects. Depending on the exact structure of its
beliefs, it is possible to have an AL investor that invests a lot in one research project and
allocates the rest of his budget in the risk-free asset. But the Ambiguity Loving investors
want a high share x of the revenue V , and they are more likely to want the property rights
as well. The AL investors prefer the AA researchers because they are willing to give
up the property rights if they can invest less effort into the research project. The AL
investors are likely to hire Ambiguity Averse researchers who want to work for a fixed
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lump-sum wage wi(e0) because then the investors can keep all the value V of a discovery
(x = 1).
What emerges here is some form of "natural matching", where one agent has a ten-
dency to reach an agreement with an agent that has the opposite Ambiguity Attitude.
The Ambiguity Lover type wants to take greater risks, invest more, and keep the prop-
erty rights of the innovation. Therefore, the AL agents are likely to strike a deal with
the Ambiguity Averse agents who are looking for the exact opposite. It is in this sense
that I suggested in chapter 4.3 that the bargaining power of the parties have only a small
impact on the allocation of the property rights and the determination of the sharing rule
x. The more agents in the innovation competition, the more likely there will be positive
matches. As a personal inclination, I fancy thinking the AA investors as Venture capital
firms that finance a lot of entrepreneur-innovators à la Silicon Valley. I also imagine the
AL investors as big research units that hires the innovator-workers, a bit like the public
sector or Universities’ departments. Of course this is only a narrative; it should not be
interpreted in a literal sense.
It is important to observe that this innovation competition is somewhat asymmetric.
I do not want to endogenise the entry of the researchers and investors in the innova-
tion competition, but it is reasonable to believe that the number of researchers n will be
"relatively small" and its "supply" inelastic. After all, the ability to conduct a research
project requires both skills and an idea of what to do. But on the investment side there
are almost no barriers to entry; even Ambiguity Averse investors can make their Utility
if they can hedge the Ambiguity. This leads me to think that A- the competition among
investors will work in favour of more bargaining power to the researchers and patent
holders. B- It is possible that a lot of money will be "wasted" on unfruitful research
projects. C- A reduction of the returns r of the risk-free asset induces AA investors at
the margin to invest in the innovation competition. This will have an impact on the total
amount of investment, the risk level of portfolios and the bargaining power of the parties.
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The relationship between the value V of the innovation and the total amount of in-
vestment T = ∑ j∈J ∑i∈I E∗j, i is very thin. Of course, a higher V implies a higher level
of investment T , so T is monotonically increasing in V . But because the marginal pro-
ductivity of money is Ambiguous there is no reason to postulate any other relationship
between T and V . In particular, there is no reason to consider that T = V . I am in-
clined to think that if the number of agents is high and B > V , then T > V . In words,
I am inclined to think that if the number of agents is high their cumulative efforts will
outreach the benefits available. This possibility is worth further investigation because it
could be used by a Social Planner to induces firm to "over-invest" in R&D. This Social
Planner could take into account the Consumer Surplus that cannot be captured by firms
and choose the reward V accordingly.
To conclude this section it is necessary to look at the impacts of a change in the in-
formation available to the investors. Let us consider a situation where the probability of
winning is a function of the ability of the researcher. This ability is not directly observ-
able, but the investors believe that it is correlated with other characteristics such as the
education or the track record of the researcher. Assuming that researchers are hetero-
geneous in their observable characteristics 4 induces a new ordering of the preferences
of the investors about sets of alternatives A . In other words, some research projects
will rank higher in the preference relation % of the investors. It is easier to express this
possibility in the framework of Ellsberg’s three-colors urn experiment. Let’s say that the
DM knows that there is 90 balls of three colors, with exactly 30 red balls and at least one
black ball. This situation may not change the Ambiguity Attitude of the person making
a bet but an Ambiguity Loving DM will certainly prefer to bet on black. As a parallel,
this means that the researcher(s) i at the top of the preference ranking may dispropor-
tionally be an attractive investment. And this is true without regard to its actual real
ability. By the same token, this higher place in the preference ranking is likely to allow
the researcher to negotiate a higher share (1− x) of V . The impact of this information
depends on the exact structure of the beliefs of the investors. It is possible that the few
4. They do not need to be heterogeneous in their ability.
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researchers at the top of the preference ranking have a lot of resources, while the other
researchers are not even considered for investment. This question of altering the ranking
preference % leads us to the role of the last agent, the patent holder.
5.3 The Patent Holder
Remember that the patent holder (PH) has a simple choice: whether or not to give
access to a patent pool to some researchers. This patent pool augments the probability
of winning the innovation competition and giving access to it is free. However, the PH
can and wants to make money out of it. He has three choices: 1- He can sell the access
to the patent pool for a lump-sum payment. 2- He can sell the access for a claim xq over
the value V in case of a discovery. 3- He can become some form of middle-man, hiring
the researcher on one side and looking for investment on the other. The patent holder
may be cash constrained or not and it will affect his behaviour.
A researcher with access to the patent pool will have a higher probability of winning
the innovation race. This reduces the Ambiguity surrounding the research project while
making it more attractive for investment. In other words, a research project that has ac-
cess ranks higher in the preferences of investors. Therefore, the compensation for the
access needs to be either a lump-sum payment from the investor or a claim xq over V
because the researcher is cash constrained and cannot pay. 5 But the "natural matching"
effect of the previous section offers a simple way to think about it. The AL investors
/ AA researcher duo is likely to prefer the lump-sum payment because the investor is
willing to put more money up-front in exchange for a higher claim over the revenue. On
the other hand, the AA investor / AL researcher duo is likely to prefer relinquishing a
claim on the value V of a discovery. The AA investor wants to minimise his investment
in one project (he wants to diversify) and the researcher is cash constrained.
5. It could also be a mix between the two solutions.
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The third possibility is quite interesting. A patent holder that acts as a middle-man
can extract money from Ambiguity Averse agents. Remember that on one side, the suf-
ficiently AA researcher always prefers U(e0) to any other form of arrangement. There-
fore, the PH can hire him at the price of wi(e0) to do the research. The PH becomes
himself a "research unit" that looks for outside investment. The AA investors are willing
to invest in exchange of a relatively small claim x on V , but they are reluctant to pay for
the wages of the researchers. Therefore, the PH can guarantee for himself the revenue
(1−x)Pi(e0,E0,q = 1)∗V for the cost wi(e0) of hiring the researcher. Of course, the PH
can invest more money if he deems it necessary and has access to the funds. This position
between two AA agents also allows the PH to keep the property rights of the innovation:
both AA agents are willing to let it go. Finally, the PH can even act as middle-man
between other types of agents. But this possibility depends on the exact structure of the
beliefs of the agents and cannot be explored further with our simple treatment.
Finally let us consider a succession of innovation competitions, where the patent reg-
istered at an early date has an impact on the probability of winning the next competition.
In this case a patent holder is likely to stay at the head of the innovation competitions, es-
pecially if he can buy a lot of research projects cheaply. This is in essence similar to the
idea of a Patent Gridlock, sometimes called an innovation Gridlock. Generally speaking,
a Gridlock is a situation where an incumbent monopoly in a market is able to harness the
competition and prevent entries because future innovations require access to the current
technology, or patent. Which brings me to an embarrassing situation. I assumed that V
was given, like a gift coming from the heaven. But now there is a situation where the
next period can be influenced by the current period, and where the real value of holding
the property rights may be higher than the simple value of the price V . In other words,
the real future value of today’s patent may affect the allocation of the property right in a
way that is not captured by my treatment of the determination of the share x of V .
This presentation of the patent holder is limited but still gives insights regarding the
impact of patents. In the last section it was suggested that a researcher who ranks higher
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in the preferences of the investors will benefit from it disproportionally. This is because
all the investors will want to finance him, and they are more likely to overlook the other
researchers. But now the PH can act as a research unit by hiring researchers on one side
and capturing investments on the other. This means that he can "cover" multiple research
paths while spending little of his own money and still keep both the property rights of a
discovery and a share xq of the revenue V . Furthermore, if the PH wins the innovation
competition he will be in the same situation for the next competition related to his sector




It is time to step back and think critically about this presentation. In the first chapter
I mentioned that I am inspired by the Austrian approach to economics. This school of
thought is very concerned by the impact of Uncertainty, incentives and property rights
on economic outcomes. The meticulous attention they give to entrepreneurship and in-
novation is characteristic. The Austrians are also inclined to focus more on the processes
that lead to an equilibrium than on the equilibrium itself. Finally, they recognize the cru-
cial role of private property and property rights in modern economic development. But
I disagree with the Austrians’ relative distaste for a mathematical approach to economic
problems.
The literature about decision-making under Ambiguity contains powerful tools that
enable the modelling complex problems. I would argue that the analysis of R& D, en-
trepreneurship and innovation presents difficulties that could now be lifted. The first goal
of this presentation was to give an example of how to approach ideas of the Austrian
school through the lenses of decision-theory. By looking at the allocation of property
rights under Ambiguity it was possible to turn a standard model of Industrial Organi-
sation about R&D into a meditation on the impact of a higher order of Uncertainty. I
would suggest that this first goal has been met and hope the reader agrees.
But the presentation lacks rigour. A complete analysis of the topic would need to use
the real Ambiguous Utility functions of [Ghirardato et al., 2004], model every possible
belief structure of the agents and characterise the resulting equilibrium. Furthermore, a
complete analysis should also use other preference relations that are not Invariant Bisep-
arable preferences. But all of this could only be done at the cost of extensive comparative
statics. I do not know how much more insights this exercises would have yielded. Those
insights may be summarised in four statements:
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A- The effectiveness of the incentives given to an agent facing Ambiguity depends
on his Ambiguity Attitude. Incentives given to an Ambiguity Loving agent will be mag-
nified by his "optimism"; they are very effective. On the other hand, incentives given
to an Ambiguity Averse agent will have less impact than in traditional Principal-Agent
models. In extreme cases the incentives may even have no effect at all. The impact of
the Ambiguity Attitude on incentives is independent of the Risk Attitude of the decision-
makers.
B- The ability to mix between different alternatives will strongly impact the decision-
making of Ambiguity Averse agents. AA agents that are unable to mix are more likely
to choose the constant alternative than the one who can hedge Ambiguity. This mani-
fests itself in our model by a tendency of the Ambiguity Averse researchers to enter the
innovation competition as innovator-workers instead of innovator-entrepreneurs.
C- It seems better to allocate the property rights to the partner that is the more Am-
biguity Loving. This leads to a natural partnership between AA and AL agents. Under
Ambiguity the agents have difficulty in evaluating their productivity and allocate prop-
erty rights accordingly. The allocation of property rights is therefore more influenced by
the incentive effect of ownership on the level of effort than by the marginal productivity.
D- Changes in the information available to the decision-makers have a large impact
on the allocation of resources. Specifically, a research project that has access to a patent
pool faces less Ambiguity. This opens the possibility for a patent holder to make money
with few risks. Furthermore, a patent holder can act as a middle-man between Ambigu-
ity Averse agents and claim the property rights of a discovery at low cost.
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I would like to invite the reader to think about the avenues of research this presenta-
tion opens. Even thought it is incomplete it still gives a basic framework to model the
relationship between R&D and Ambiguity. Here are some topics worth of further inves-
tigation. One possibility is, of course, to enhance the model of chapter five with more
structure by making explicit the beliefs of the agents. With specified beliefs it will also
be possible to account for Ambiguous Utility functions that behave in different ways
than MinEU and MaxEU . In particular, I believe that the uncertainty averse preferences
of [Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011] and the smooth ambiguity preferences of [Klibanoff
et al., 2005] are great candidates. The Ambiguity Averse preferences used in our model
has kinks in the Utility function MinEU . Following a presentation of professor Peter
Klibanoff [Klibanoff, 2015], uncertainty averse and smooth ambiguity preferences have
attractive monotonicity properties because they can be build with no kinks.
Another topic will be to characterise the different strategies available for a Social
Planner to subsidise R&D. I suggested that a Social Planner could incentivise firms to
invest in R&D by launching an innovation competition. This strategy is interesting be-
cause there is a possibility that the firms will "over-invest" with regard to the prize of
the competition. Therefore, a Social Planner can take into account the consumer surplus
while setting the value V of the prize. This feature could gives more "bang for the buck"
than strategies such as direct subsidies to the researchers.
I see two way to infuse dynamics in the framework. A patent holder may stay at the
frontier of innovation if there is a relationship between future and current technologi-
cal development. This happens because the PH can exclude competition in the research
phase. Modelling a succession of innovation competition under Ambiguity may shed
light on this phenomenon. Finally, it is easy to transform this competition into an inno-
vation race. It will be to develop the hypothesis that limn→∞ ∑i∈n = 1 instead of ∑i∈n = 1.
That is, to consider a situation where as long as there is no discovery new researchers
enter the race until somebody has the right approach and wins.
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